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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
: REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20031008-CA 
ROY BENJAMIN HOSKINS, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Although Defendant-Appellant Roy Benjamin Hoskins ("Hoskins") 
does not need to establish that the alleged victim witness's crimes involved 
dishonesty to show that it was harmful error for the trial court to exclude 
them, the trial did correctly find that the crimes involved dishonesty. 
A "reasonable likelihood" doesn't equate to a "preponderance of the 
evidence." The standard for a criminal conviction is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. So, it doesn't take much to establish a reasonable 
likelihood that, if Hoskins had been allowed to further attack the credibility 
of the alleged victim witness as to which party was the aggressor, the weight 
of evidence would have tipped in Hoskins' favor. 
Hoskins is entitled to a new trial so that he may confront the alleged 
victim witness against him with the impeachment evidence denied him by 
the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
ALLEGED VICTIM WITNESS'S PRIOR BURGLARIES WERE CRIMES 
INVOLVING DISHONESTY OR FALSE STATEMENT. 
As Plaintiff-Appellee Salt Lake City notes in its brief, Defendant-
Appellant Roy Benjamin Hoskins ("Hoskins") does not need to prevail on 
the issue of whether burglary is a crime involving dishonesty or false 
statement to win his appeal. See Appellee Br. p. 12-14. The reason is that 
"[t]he rule on prejudice does not apply if the defense offers the conviction." 
3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence para. 
609[04] at 609-94 (1990). 
Nonetheless, Utah's appellate courts have ruled that burglary is a 
crime of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of URE 609(a)(2) 
if "committed by fraudulent or deceitful means bearing on the [witness's] 
likelihood to testify truthfully." State v. Cravens, 15 P.3d 635, 637 (Utah Ct. 
2 
App. 2000) (citing State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989) and quoting 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989)). 
Following the voir dire examination of Mr. Wanlass, the trial court 
found that Mr. Wanlass's four convictions for burglary were "an act of 
dishonesty." Tr. 164, p. 24. On appeal, the City now claims that the trial 
court could not have found that Mr. Wanlass's four felony burglary 
convictions involved dishonesty or false statement given the evidence. See 
Appellee Br. p. 16. 
In order to challenge findings of fact, the challenger "must marshal all 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. 
Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted). Here, the 
City has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding 
that Mr. Wanlass's four felony burglary convictions were crimes involving 
dishonesty. (For this Court's reference, the transcript of the voir dire of Mr. 
Wanlass concerning his four burglary convictions is at Tr. 164, 13-15.) 
As a matter of policy, appellate courts "review a trial court's findings 
of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and will not upset them unless 
3 
they are 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake' has been 
made . . . ." State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
Trial courts are in a better position than appellate courts to ascertain 
the facts and the credibility of witnesses; a principle which is affirmed by 
Mr. Garcia's jail jumpsuit and handcuffs - which are absent from the record 
but found their way into the City's brief (Appellee Br. p. 19.). Accordingly, 
this Court should not disturb the trial court's conclusion after hearing from 
Mr. Wanlass on voir dire that his four felony burglary convictions evidenced 
dishonesty within the meaning of URE 609(a)(2). 
POINT n 
THE HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD FOR A CRIMING CASE 
ESTABLISHES A LOW THRESHOLD FOR FINDING A REASONABLE 
LIKELIHOOD OF A MORE FAVORABLE OUTCOME FOR MR. HOSKINS 
A reasonable likelihood exists that Hoskins would have received a 
more favorable outcome had the trial court not excluded the impeachment 
evidence bearing on the credibility of the alleged victim witness because of 
the high evidentiary standard required for defendants in criminal trials. 
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
4 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. With the 
presumption of innocence that Hoskins is entitled to, it is his testimony that 
casts doubt on the testimony of Wanlass and the other prosecution witnesses, 
not the other way around. Compare with Appellee Br. p. 18, 23, 
Here, applying the reasonable doubt standard to the evidence that they 
were permitted to examine, the jurors found that Hoskins was not guilty of 
the City's original charge, but guilty of a lesser-included offense. (R. 1, 4, 
93.) 
Viewed in context of the high evidentiary standard the City had to 
meet to convict Hoskins, it is not difficult to conclude that ~ had the 
excluded impeachment evidence been presented to the jurors ~ a reasonable 
likelihood exists that the jury's verdict would have tipped further in 
Hoskins' favor. 
Accordingly, Hoskins is entitled to a new trial so that he may confront 
the alleged victim witness against him with the impeachment evidence 
denied him by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Hoskins should be granted a new trial. 
5 
The trial court erroneously excluded admissible impeachment evidence of the 
alleged victim witness's prior crimes. In addition, this Court should hold that a 
reasonable likelihood exists that Mr. Hoskins would have received a more 
favorable outcome but for the trial court's error because such a holding must be 
made within the context of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" evidentiary standard. 
Dated: August 30, 2004. 
D. Gilbert Athay X 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant \ \ 
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